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THE PENTAGON AS PITCHMAN: Perception and Reality of Public Diplomacy

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Executive Summary

The Department of Defense has not institutionalized public diplomacy-like activities throughout its components, belying both hopes that it would internalize these broader concerns into its everyday activities, and fears that the Department's great scale would overwhelm all other US public diplomacy. But the evolving, post Goldwater-Nichols role of the combatant commands and SOCOM did encourage those particular organizations to develop and consolidate a program that looks very much like public diplomacy.

These conclusions have been obscured until now because of the difficulty in cataloging and costing activities within the Department of Defense that are like public diplomacy. This report is the result of a concerted effort to do so. We conclude that:

- › Most of the defense activities often implicated in public diplomacy should not be. These include most of the activities the Defense Department defines as information operations, public affairs, building partnership capacity, and even most tactical military information support operations.
- › Additionally, the Department of Defense has not broadly institutionalized public diplomacy-like activities despite a push to do so in the early 2000s. Institutionalization is the moving of people or resources, which has not happened.
- › However, Special Operations Command and the geographic combatant commands maintain one enduring and fairly defined program that is very similar to public diplomacy activities. It includes the "Trans Regional Web and Magazine Initiatives" (TRWI and TRMI) and named "VOICE" operations.
- › TRWI, TRMI, and VOICE operations were part of a \$225-million budget, including war costs, in the 2012 fiscal year (FY12). That is roughly half what the State Department spends on information-based public diplomacy and just under a third of the budget for the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
- › The contrast between one robust program and the lack of broader institutionalization is best explained by the varying identities, incentives, and missions of different military organizations. The military services have resisted institutionalizing public diplomacy-like activities to avoid diluting their long-standing missions, but the combatant commands, and especially SOCOM, have embraced such missions in response to their changing role in executing US foreign policy.

Public diplomacy offers a valuable example for how different organizations respond to different incentives and ultimately affect how US foreign policy is executed. Only by understanding these organizations and their incentives can we anticipate the military's future role in executing US foreign policy.

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Introduction

Opinions on US public diplomacy and the Defense Department's relationship to it are fairly polarized. Some fear that the Department of Defense drastically expanded efforts to influence global public opinion in the course of the war on terror, and that it now overshadows civilian public diplomacy efforts. Others argue the Department of Defense can only address threats like terrorism by getting better at influencing public opinion.¹ But both perspectives lack an empirical understanding of the Defense Department's public diplomacy-like activities. Instead, the debate is bogged down in the semantics of defining terms, arguments about the proper roles of the State Department and Defense Departments, and questions about how best to influence foreign audiences. These debates rest on suppositions that the Defense Department is doing more than we know, and on allusions to many defense missions and military entities that may or may not be conducting public diplomacy-like activities.

All of these debates would be better informed with a more exact articulation of what the Department of Defense does in the field of public diplomacy. This report is the result of a concerted study to identify and cost Department of Defense public diplomacy-like activities. The reality check it provides should advance each of these debates.

There has been no widespread institutionalization of public diplomacy-like activities throughout the Defense Department despite a great deal of rhetoric and effort. However, this lack of diffuse institutionalization emphasizes one Defense Department program that is nearly identical to civilian public diplomacy activities. The Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the geographic combatant commands (COCOMs) run media websites aimed at regional audiences and deploy small teams to embassies worldwide to influence public opinion. Though not on the scale of the State Department's public diplomacy activities, let alone US international broadcasting, this single program does make the Defense Department a significant player in US public diplomacy efforts.

This program developed the way it did because the Defense Department is comprised of distinct organizations that respond to different incentives. The military services are the bulk of the Defense Department, and they are loath to cloud their well-defined missions with a vague task like public diplomacy. But the combatant commands already have a nebulous mission and found it worthwhile to embrace this task. Meanwhile, SOCOM focused on solidifying its relatively new, official role as "global synchronizer" by centralizing these efforts under a program it runs. Each of these perspectives and decisions hinge on changes to organizational incentives within the Defense Department in the last 30 years.

This report provides a narrative for how these outcomes occurred. It begins in Part I by examining the context surrounding concerns about the militarization of public diplomacy. It then catalogs and costs Defense Department public diplomacy-like activities. Armed with these findings, it moves into Part II and traces how efforts to institutionalize public diplomacy-like activities failed in the military services even as how SOCOM and the combatant commanders consolidated their program. Finally, it provides an explanation for these seemingly contradictory outcomes. Maintaining this focus meant setting aside many important issues bearing on how the United States conducts public diplomacy, but these conclusions add valuable and otherwise-missing insights into how our foreign policy is executed.

Most intriguingly, public diplomacy provides a case study on the changing roles of national security institutions in US foreign policy making.

Part I

Concerns About the Militarization of Public Diplomacy

A large body of literature already exists asserting that the Defense Department has militarized public diplomacy in the last decade.² That literature identifies two principle causes: the weakness of the State Department's public diplomacy efforts following the dissolution of the independent US Information Agency (USIA) in 1999, and the military's 'need' to compensate for that weakness in order to achieve its mission during the Global War on Terror.³ And the literature has a basic conclusion: "the Department of Defense engages in extensive public diplomacy and strategic communication activities. Its vast and increasing resources for public diplomacy and strategic communication exceed civilian resources."⁴

This conclusion has been continually reinforced by the steady flow of news stories over the last decade. Major investigations have grabbed headlines at outlets ranging from the *New York Times* and *Los Angeles Times* to *Harpers* and *Rolling Stone*. Most recently, *USA Today* ran a dozen articles in a 2012 series on defense public diplomacy.⁵ All of them share a theme that the Defense Department is committed to the public diplomacy mission, with sizeable budgets and institutional weight to back it up.

One of the many concerns these stories engender is that the Defense Department is overwhelming the State Department in the public diplomacy mission area. The Obama administration explicitly acknowledged that concern in a 2010 report to Congress: "We are aware of concerns that the resources for our efforts need to be "re-balanced" according to established roles and responsibilities."⁶

Yet despite these signs and their acknowledgment, no one has assembled an authoritative or exhaustive list of Defense Department public diplomacy efforts. Peter Cary, a researcher for the Center for International Media Assistance, reported that "Congressional staffers say this budgetary drama was a wake-up call to them that indicated the Defense Department does not truly know what its information operations needs are, and what they have and should cost."⁷ We at the Stimson Center, along with the American Academy of Diplomacy, likewise found in 2008 that "the lack of precise public information about DoD's PD activities, budget, and personnel levels makes it virtually impossible to determine whether DoD PD programming is encroaching on State's authority."⁸

Cataloging Department of Defense Public Diplomacy Efforts

To address this gap, this report undertook a concerted effort to catalog public diplomacy-like activities within the Department of Defense. It found that most organizations within the Department of Defense do not conduct public diplomacy-like activities. The exception is a single – but substantial – program run by the Special Operations Command and the geographic combatant commanders.

The following section reviews areas and capabilities within the Department of Defense frequently cited as possible public diplomacy efforts. It first sets out a practical description of the activities that constitute public diplomacy in order to scope this review. After setting this standard, this section uses it to review the areas frequently cited as posing overlap with public diplomacy: information operations, public affairs, building partnership capacity, and military information support operations. Little about them meets the standard. War programs specific to Iraq and Afghanistan are more problematic, but also are contingent on operations that will not be permanent. But one enduring program is obviously like public diplomacy: the combatant commands' and Special Operations Command's Trans-Regional Web and Magazine Initiatives and related VOICE operations. This section will conclude by using the budget to provide a sense of scale for that program relative to public diplomacy efforts in the civilian agencies.

Framing Public Diplomacy

Defining public diplomacy, and hence the Defense Department's involvement in it, is not straightforward. If the issue could have been resolved by consulting a dictionary, it would have been taken care of long ago. Even the White House struggled to clarify the definition as part of its 2010 report on strategic communication, finding for instance that “different uses of the term ‘strategic communication’ have led to significant confusion.”⁹

Defense Department definitions are unsatisfying. Eight years of controversy about public diplomacy have made the Defense Department conscientious about insisting that the State Department formally is responsible for US public diplomacy efforts. The term it favors, ‘strategic communication,’ seems close to the State Department's public diplomacy definition, but with the additional advantage of stressing that Defense is not trying to lead US government efforts to conduct public diplomacy.¹⁰ Not surprisingly, these definitions do not clarify which activities are public diplomacy and which are not.¹¹

Nor can we rely on formal assignment of the role of public diplomacy. Again, the Defense Department has stated over and over again that it only supports public diplomacy efforts, and therefore cannot have formally designated organizations to conduct them.¹² As a result, there is no single office or organization responsible for public diplomacy-like activities.¹³

The study cuts through this definitional thicket using a practical approach focused on identifying relevant activities within the Defense Department. It will refer to

relevant activities as “public diplomacy-like activities” to denote the blurriness of these definitions. Three guidelines bound the search.

First, it considered only activities: people, programs, or resources dedicated to something like public diplomacy. The Defense Department’s concepts of public diplomacy, and especially strategic communication, have turned more toward processes rather than specific activities as they developed in the last decade. While it is important to consider the processes and practices that integrate US-government efforts into a consistent message, these topics have been thoroughly covered elsewhere.¹⁴ This report will focus on a narrower purpose: to catalogue the areas in which the Defense Department is conducting activities like public diplomacy. Along with adding new facts to the debate, this approach has the benefit of sidestepping these definitional pitfalls.

Second, the study considered only activities within the Defense Department. The Defense Department does not operate alone in executing foreign policy, nor is the State Department the only other player. Most important are the interagency efforts to direct and coordinate US foreign policy, especially those involving the National Security Council and staff. These efforts are real, and over the last few decades there have been people and resources dedicated to them.¹⁵ But these activities are inseparable from the broader discussions of Presidential authority and the coordination among national security organizations.¹⁶ Those twists and turns fall outside of this report’s scope.

Third, the search considered only specific public diplomacy-like activities, not the broader activities of the Defense Department. It is now both a truism and a cliché that all actions communicate.¹⁷ Taking such an approach—though invaluable in assessing US foreign policy—would make this cataloging task immaterial. The Defense Department is the largest US government agency, with 10 times the budget of all international affairs funding and 100 times the personnel of the State Department. If all of its activities were included, it tautologically would dominate US foreign policy.

Cataloging the Defense Department’s Public Diplomacy-Like Activities

Using this standard allows us to review the activities most often identified as public diplomacy, describe the extent to which they meet the standard, and then cost them to provide a sense of scale. There are as many parsings of this data as there are individuals participating in the debate, and we provide the data not to foreclose that debate but rather to ground it.

Information Operations

The obvious place to start is those programs formally labeled by the Defense Department as Information Operations. The term ‘information operations’ sounds like strategic communication and public diplomacy and many use the term colloquially to mean strategic communication and public diplomacy. Congress certainly does. In its FY10 committee report, the Senate appropriations committee under the heading “Strategic

Communications” leads with the following sentence: “The Committee believes that there is a legitimate role for the Department of Defense [DOD] in information operations.”¹⁸

The difficulty is the Defense Department defines information operations doctrinally, and most of the capabilities related to it do not seem like strategic communication or public diplomacy. Information operations’ doctrinal definition explicitly associates it with five core capabilities: operations security, electronic warfare, computer network operations, military deception, and military information support operations.¹⁹

Operations security—or OPSEC—is defined formally as “a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities.”²⁰ Informally, it means keeping information from the enemy. Most would not consider protecting our own information to be public diplomacy.

Electronic Warfare is “military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.”²¹ While information may flow on the electromagnetic spectrum, blocking transmissions is not the same thing as providing information, especially in the more common tactical cases of jamming radars or localized communications.²²

Computer Network Operations is the umbrella for attacking and defending computer networks, neither of which involve providing information to the public over computer networks. Computer Network Operations has grown in importance in the last decade, usually under the terms Cyber security and Cyber attack.

Military deception is action intended to mislead decision-makers for adversary militaries. By definition it is targeted at decision makers, and less at broader publics. Unlike the other core capabilities of information operations, it also tends toward a process or use of other capabilities rather than a group of capabilities directly assigned to it.

Military information support operations (MISO), formerly called psychological operations, houses many activities, most of which are not like public diplomacy but also one that is. MISO is a central case in defining what Defense Department activities are public diplomacy and will be discussed separately.

With the exception of MISO, information operations tend to be technical capabilities that pertain to information but not to ideas or influencing others’ thinking.²³ That does not accord well with what is usually meant by public diplomacy or strategic communication.²⁴ Yet still the term is frequently referenced when describing public diplomacy-like activities.

That colloquialism exaggerates the resources at play in the Defense Department. Operational security, electronic warfare, computer network operations, and military deception have significant costs that, if included, would swamp all other public diplomacy programs. For instance, aircraft dedicated to jamming would be included as part of electronic warfare. The Navy is spending \$1 billion a year right now on its new airborne electronic attack aircraft, with a total program cost of roughly \$9 billion. Operations Security similarly could include the costs to protect satellites from being compromised, and perhaps the satellites themselves with price tags as high as \$1 billion each. Yet those activities have little to do with the common understanding of public diplomacy and should not be included.

A later section will suggest how information operations came to be a colloquial description of strategic communication even though its formal definition is so far from it.

Public Affairs

Public Affairs is on the opposite end of the spectrum from doctrinal Information Operations. Public affairs are the spokespeople of the Department of Defense, and they serve much the same role as spokespeople for other government agencies, corporations or any organization.

The primary representative of the Defense Department is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD (PA)). This person and their office “is responsible for supporting the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense in his dealings with the press, public information, internal information, community relations, information training, and audiovisual matters.”²⁵ ASD (PA) also oversees the Defense Media Activity, the centralized information and entertainment provider for “the [Defense Department] worldwide military audience – active, reserve, civilian and contractors, including their families, on land and at sea.”²⁶ The Defense Media Activity manages four specific programs: overseas radio and television, the Stars and Stripes newspaper, the Defense Information School, and News and Media Information Products. The first two are aimed at internal Defense Department audiences—those who work for the department. The third is to train public affairs and related skills. The fourth, News and Media Information Products, audience includes “the internal [Defense Department] family (active, guard, and reserve military service members, dependents, retirees, [Defense Department] civilians, and contract employees) and external audiences.” Despite acknowledging a broader audience, though, it is focused on internal audiences to the department.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs has his own staff office for public affairs. Each military service also has its own public affairs corps extending from the headquarters level through subordinate commands and onto individual installations. And the combatant commands, the four-star regional and functional commanders who oversee joint operations, all have their own organic public affairs staffs. Finally, the Joint Public

Affairs Support Element (JPASE) was established in 2006 and now has 25 personnel within Transportation Command ready to deploy worldwide to support operations.

All of these organizations add up to a robust public affairs capacity. The Defense Media Activity received \$270 million in FY12 for civilian personnel, operations, and procurement, a figure that excludes the costs of the military personnel working within it. ASD (PA) has an operational budget of just under \$7 million, and that's separate from personnel costs. JPASE is part of a broader group of standing headquarters support with an annual budget of \$15 million. The Navy is the only service to display its Public Affairs budget separately, and shows \$14 million for FY12 and a request of \$13 million for FY13. The other three services include public affairs spending within broader service-wide administration and base support accounts, but the scale of specific public affairs activities is likely close to the Navy's figure. Uniformed personnel conducting public affairs add roughly \$475 million cost across all of the services.

Although robustly funded and charged in part with providing information to foreign audiences, Public Affairs behaves in a fundamentally different way than envisioned by public diplomacy. The most recent Public Affairs doctrine includes a new section that describes public affairs as one of strategic communication's primary capabilities, but its organizing principles and tenets focus on the traditional spokesperson role and use phrases like "make available timely and accurate information..." and "tell the DoD story." Every US government agency has this sort of public affairs capability, and professionals within it see their role, at best, as supporting public diplomacy.²⁷ Including it within public diplomacy would define the US government's efforts much more widely than usual.

Closely related to Public Affairs and on a similar scale of funding is recruiting advertising by the military services. The US military has been an All-Voluntary Force since the 1970s, and it recruits more than 150,000 new service-members every year to fill its 1.5 million active duty military positions. To do so, the Defense Department advertises heavily, and this is one of the military's most public engagements.²⁸ The Defense Department spent \$632 million on advertising in FY12.²⁹ But though these funds are of significant scale and play a large role in shaping the public image of the military, they are not generally considered public diplomacy since their primary audience is domestic.

Building Partnership Capacity

One of the most challenging types of activity to classify as public diplomacy or not are activities known as "Building Partnership Capacity." Building Partnership Capacity is the current term for activities that used to be called security cooperation, and it may even stray in to the broader concept of peacetime engagement.³⁰ Some would include humanitarian assistance within the realm of Building Partnership Capacity. This report uses Building Partnership Capacity (BPC) as an umbrella term capturing

those activities intended to train, equip, advise, or assist a foreign country's military or population for an operational or strategic purpose.³¹

Some BPC activities are explicitly undertaken to affect people's opinion of the United States. The easiest examples are the Regional Centers run by the Defense Department.³² These five geographically focused centers are clearly public diplomacy-like activities. Their legislative charter says each "serves as a forum for bilateral and multilateral research, communication, and exchange of ideas involving military and civilian participants."³³ And the National Defense University Foundation describes them as "one of the key strategic communication tools to explain US government security policy in the world and to obtain feedback on US policies from other countries."³⁴ These descriptions add up to public diplomacy.

The Defense Department also runs the Regional Counterterrorism Fellows Program (CTFP) and other training and exchanges. The CTFP was created shortly after 9/11 to fund counterterrorism training and education for foreign personnel.³⁵ The State Department classifies its exchanges and fellowship programs as public diplomacy, so this program also should be included as a Defense Department public diplomacy activity. The Defense Department also has a role in other exchanges and training for foreign military personnel, including as part of foreign military financing and sales. Finally, the Defense Department executes the International Military Education and Training. This program is managed and funded by the State Department, though. The State Department does not list it as a public diplomacy activity even though it is parallel to other exchange programs that do have that label.

Other BPC programs have an even more complex relationship to public diplomacy. Some have specific goals unrelated to public diplomacy: international research and development, counternarcotic programs, and cooperation with the Russian Federation to reduce residual nuclear threats. Some are focused on more traditional diplomacy or military-to-military engagements: Iraq and Afghanistan Security Forces Funds, Section 1206 Global Train and Equip, NATO Support, Coalition Support Fund, Lift and Sustain, Warsaw Initiative Fund, and Section 1208 Support to Foreign Forces, and the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.³⁶

Still other BPC programs are not specifically for public diplomacy but are designed to allow greater flexibility and discretion so public diplomacy considerations might be weighted when employing them. Those could include the Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund, Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid, or even Joint/Combined Exchange Training. US Navy hospital ships responded to the 2004 Indonesian earthquake in an especially notable example, and that increased Indonesians favorable opinions of the United States. Since then, many have explicitly called for using hospital ships and other resources to improve public opinion of the United States. Doing so would seem to push these activities toward public diplomacy.³⁷ A similar example is

using construction units to build wells or other projects that improve people's lives and presumably influence them.³⁸

The program hardest to classify is the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). CERP enables "US Commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their Area of Responsibility (AOR) by carrying out programs that will immediately assist the indigenous population."³⁹ Many commanders view this as a tool to win hearts and minds, a public diplomacy-like activity.⁴⁰ They have used it for widely varying purposes, from compensating families when their homes are damaged to painting murals alongside an Iraqi highway.⁴¹ Still the program is not formally described as a strategic communication program, and its frequently tactical usage makes it difficult to rule it in or out as a whole.

Most of these activities are communicating actions – like everything the Defense Department does – but are not dedicated to public diplomacy. But they clearly are cusp cases, related to public diplomacy effects though not dedicated to them. Their blurriness helps drive the ongoing discussion about what role the Defense Department and the US government should play in influencing foreign audiences and how to do so. But strictly cataloging the Defense Department's public diplomacy-like activities means not counting these programs—save the Regional Centers and fellowships—because they are not dedicated to the mission. That judgment is circumstantial, however, and these activities should be reviewed again when considered for any other purpose, as even a slight change in focus would give them a public diplomacy effect.

Military Information Support Operations (MISO)

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) or Military Information Support Operations is another element of the military relevant to this research. In 2010, the Secretary of Defense ratified a decision to change the title of these missions from the traditional psychological operations to Military Information Support Operations (MISO). This transition was simply a name change.⁴² We will refer to it as MISO. But MISO itself is a broad term. Doctrinally it is a component of Information Operations but, unlike everything else under that umbrella, MISO is closely connected to public diplomacy. The Department of Defense defined MISO—then psychological operations—in its 2010 Consolidated Report on Information Operations as "planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives."

The bulk of MISO activities are predominantly tactical activities meant to support specific military commanders in specific situations. They include leaflet drops and localized radio broadcasts to inform adversary forces of how to surrender safely, advise

civilians on how to avoid battlefield risk, or explain local US military operations in a favorable light. No MISO can be categorically called tactical since all influence operations can have strategic effects, but most MISO is closer to the tactical end of the spectrum than the strategic.⁴³ These activities are not like public diplomacy.

The US has several MISO units: the Army's 4th and 8th Military Information Support Groups based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the Army Reserve's 2nd and 7th Psychological Operation Groups, and the Pennsylvania Air National Guard's 193rd Special Operations Wing, which flies the modified C-130 aircraft that serve as mobile broadcast platforms, called Commando Solo.⁴⁴ Personnel account for the vast majority of MISO spending in 2012. The Army's active personnel number about 2,300, the reservists about 5,700, and 1-1,500 for the Air Force unit.⁴⁵ Altogether, at least 9,000 service-members likely contribute to this work. Roughly \$475 million went to these service-members' salaries and benefits that year. Congress appropriated at least another \$40 million for procurement and research. In total the mission cost over \$500 million. Most would consider MISO to predominantly be a traditional military mission, though definitely a cusp case for public diplomacy-like activities.

Clearly Public Diplomacy-Like Activities

Voice and Trans-Regional Web Initiative

In contrast to the traditional and more tactical MISO capabilities is a program that is essentially strategic and very like public diplomacy. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Geographic Combatant Commands are substantially invested in multi-year programs whose core is a series of news websites built for civilians in regions around the world. Also included are "information support" teams deployed to Embassies around the globe and a centralized planning cell based at SOCOM's headquarters. COCOMs have centered the program around named VOICE operations and SOCOM ties them closely to the Trans Regional Web and Magazine Initiatives.⁴⁶

The Senate Armed Services Committee described the Trans Regional Web Initiative as an "initiative under which USSOCOM establishes and maintains news and information websites in support of the geographic combatant command's (GCC) countering violent extremism objectives."⁴⁷ SOCOM further explained it in an October 2008 contract solicitation:

Content shall include but is not limited to original features, news, sports, entertainment, economics, politics, cultural reports, business, and similar items of interest to targeted readers...

Content will be oriented to the appropriate target audiences and will convey the messages and achieve the objectives identified by the respective [combatant commands] and USSOCOM (JMISC) in applicable [concept of operations]...⁴⁸

Under this part of SOCOM's synchronizing umbrella are COCOM operations that share the general designator "VOICE:" Operation OBJECTIVE VOICE in Africa Command, Operation EARNEST VOICE in Central Command, Operation ASSURED VOICE in European Command, Operation CLEAR VOICE in Northern Command, Operation RELIANT VOICE in Pacific Command, and Operation SOVEREIGN VOICE in Southern Command.⁴⁹ General Charles Wald, then-Deputy Commander of European Command, explained VOICE in a EUCOM context. "USEUCOM's [information operations] efforts consist of a wide variety of actions across many discrete lines of operation, being executed across the theater under the umbrella of Operation Assured Voice," he indicated. "The operation consists of a collection of specific programs, including military information support teams, Web-based initiatives, and collaboration with private industry throughout the area of responsibility."⁵⁰

Public media websites are the core of VOICE operations. They provide original reporting and content tailored to specific regions and audiences in order to express the United States and its operations in a positive light.⁵¹ Six are readily available:

Website	Region	COCOM	URL
<i>South East European Times</i>	Balkans	EUCOM	www.setimes.com
<i>Magharebia</i>	Trans-Sahara/ N. Africa	AFRICOM	www.magharebia.com
<i>Mawtani al-Shorfa</i>	Iraq	CENTCOM	www.mawtani.al-shorfa.com
<i>Al-Shorfa</i>	Middle East	CENTCOM	www.al-shorfa.com
<i>Central Asia Online</i>	Central Asia/ Pakistan	CENTCOM	www.centralasiaonline.com
<i>Info sur Hoy</i>	Latin America	SOUTHCOM	www.infosurhoy.com

And this may not be all of them. The Pentagon's 2011 budget request alluded to eight sites, meaning that two more – likely belonging to PACOM and NORTHCOM – may be active but not yet identified.⁵² Also in the public domain are publications wrapped up into the "Trans Regional Magazine Initiative." SOUTHCOM's *Dialogo*, PACOM's *Asia-Pacific Defence Forum*, and EUCOM's *Per Concordiam* are publicly-available online, while CENTCOM's *Unipath* and AFRICOM's *Africa Defence Forum* do not appear to be. Unlike the websites, which have the strong appearance of civilian journalism, these magazines are prominently acknowledged by the combatant commands and seem to define their audience as foreign military partners interested in the trade and the profession.

Beyond just the websites and magazines, “Military Information Support Teams” appear to be part of VOICE operations. These teams are small, usually four to ten military personnel, and they operate out of US embassies to conduct public diplomacy-like activities. SOCOM’s chief described them in a March 2011 hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee:

Outside the areas of conflict, SOCOM deploys Military Information Support Teams (MISTs) to countries supporting military objectives to erode support for extremist ideologies and deter tacit and active support for VEOs [violent extremist organizations]. Deployed at the request of both the GCC [geographic Combatant Commander] and the respective US Ambassador, MISTs provide the GCCs with a direct engagement tool to improve partner nation capabilities to combat VEOs and resist the spread of their associated ideologies.⁵³

As of March 2012, 22 of these teams are deployed around the world.⁵⁴

The program also includes what can best be described as a centralized planning cell. Originally called the Joint Psychological Operations Support Element, it began as centrally-located surge capacity for the COCOMs and evolved into a cell coordinating strategic messages at SOCOM headquarters. A later section of this report provides a more detailed explanation of this cell and the entire program’s development over the last decade or so.⁵⁵

This program’s budget is parceled out between the COCOMs and SOCOM. The Defense Department publishes these figures annually but without disaggregating them or defining anything else that might be included. Costs for SOCOM’s top-level coordinating role have dropped from \$168 million in 2009 to just over \$50 million in 2012. Five of the combatant command programs have ranged in annual cost from \$1 to \$6 million, though EUCOM’s program ran at the \$8 million level from 2009 to 2012. Table 1 provides a summary of the funding over the last five years by COCOM.

CENTCOM, which has responsibility for the Middle East, has averaging almost \$30 million a year since 2009, a substantially larger program than the other COCOMs. That triples EUCOM’s cost, is 10-20 times that of the other COCOMs, and suggests activities beyond just those described here. A CENTCOM spokesperson has acknowledged broader efforts than just the news websites: “The technology supports classified blogging activities on foreign-language websites to enable CENTCOM to counter violent extremist and enemy propaganda outside the US.”⁵⁶ CENTCOM’s funding has switched back and forth between base budget funding and war funding in the past five years. In FY09, its funding was provided in the accounts dedicated to funding war operations. Importantly, this funding is not likely to have been funding specifically for Iraq or Afghanistan, as a separate line displays that funding. This is not particularly unusual. The war accounts are used in other areas to fund other operations outside of Iraq and Afghanistan, usually related to counterterrorism. In

Table 1: Budget Authority for VOICE Operations, TRWI, and Other Public-Diplomacy-Like Military Activities

	FY2009 Actual	FY2010 Actual	FY2011 Actual	FY2012 Enacted	FY2013 Request
Africa Command	\$1.8	\$4.8	\$5.7	\$4.8	\$3.0
Central Command	\$32.9	\$31.4	\$25.4	\$23.8	\$29.4
European Command	\$8.1	\$8.8	\$8.2	\$8.8	\$3.0
Northern Command	\$1.6	\$1.2	\$4.2	\$4.0	\$1.5
Pacific Command	\$0.0	\$6.0	\$5.5	\$4.0	\$2.0
Southern Command	\$0.0	\$4.7	\$8.1	\$4.6	\$3.0
Special Operations Command	\$168.4	\$108.7	\$84.7	\$53.8	\$58.9
Iraq and Afghanistan	\$364.0	\$328.7	\$150.3	\$121.2	\$122.8

Source: Department of Defense Operations and Maintenance Overview Books, FY11-13

FY10, Congress moved CENTCOM's funding for these programs back into the base budget, suggesting the programs are enduring programs, programs that are expected to continue even after the United States withdraws from both Iraq and Afghanistan.⁵⁷ This report did not research these specific activities in any further detail but these clues suggest CENTCOM's programs may be fundamentally different than the other combatant commands, though it also includes the elements described here such as the websites listed above.

Outside of CENTCOM, SOCOM's and the other combatant command's programs seem to be composed of the three pieces described above: public media websites, MIST teams, and a centralized planning cell.

Programs Specific to Iraq and Afghanistan

The Defense Department also breaks out funding in the war zones of Iraq and Afghanistan. It is significantly larger than the other programs', exceeding their combined value every year and doubling their funding in 2010.

Including these wartime figures in the same category as these other programs indicates that they fund public diplomacy-like activities. The Defense Department does not account for the things within them in an unclassified form, but they likely include the programs that fueled the media firestorm and first brought attention to the Defense

Department's public diplomacy-like activities. Still this report does not focus on these activities, partly because secrecy makes them opaque but also because war zone activities are inherently self-limiting. They still are public diplomacy-like activities but, unlike TRWI and VOICE operations, they're limited to these countries and less like to endure when conflict ebbs.

Comparing these Programs to Civilian Agency Public Diplomacy Activities


Two top-level conclusions about the Defense Department's public diplomacy-like activities are most important. These activities have not diffused throughout the Defense Department – but they are a significant part of SOCOM's and the COCOM's work via the Trans-Regional Web Initiative and VOICE operations. One measure of that significance is scale. The following section briefly reviews public diplomacy efforts at the State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors, both successors to the dissolved US Information Agency, to provide a scale by which to measure the Defense Department's activities. Making this comparison demonstrates that the Defense Department's activities are significant but that they do not eclipse civilian efforts.

The State Department provides an annual summary of the resources it devotes to Public Diplomacy. Those resources divide into two basic categories: centers and exchanges, and information-based public diplomacy.

State Department exchanges are primarily run through the Education and Cultural Exchange Programs and are meant “to foster mutual understanding through people-to-people exchange programs.”⁵⁸ This also includes the Eisenhower Exchange Fellowship Program and Israeli Arab Scholarship program, both of which are provided funding from interest in trust funds and total less than \$1 million each. The centers are the National Endowment for Democracy, which strengthens democratic institutions, and the East-West Center, which promotes relationships with the Asia-Pacific region. The State Department considers everything in this category to be public diplomacy. Total funding in FY12 was \$732 million.

The State Department also oversees and funds International Military Education and Training (IMET), though the Department of Defense administers the program. IMET's focus on training normally excludes it from public diplomacy, but one of the training goals is similar to civilian exchange programs: “to develop a common understanding of shared international challenges, including terrorism, and fosters the relationships necessary to counter those challenges in a collaborative manner.” IMET was funded at \$106 million in FY12.

This is far from all of the US' international exchange programs. So many other government agencies sponsor them that an interagency working group was set up in 1997 to monitor and coordinate the programs. That group's mission helpfully includes providing an annual inventory of government-wide international exchange programs. It found 246 different international exchange and training programs across

Chart 1: US Government International Centers and Exchanges

* IMET: International Military Education and Training, managed by State but executed by DoD


Source: FY2011 Annual Report, Interagency Working Group on US Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training; FY10 data including all USG funding.

63 government agencies in FY10.⁵⁹ Not including exchanges run by the Departments of State or Defense, these exchanges cost \$692 million in FY10.

Information-based public diplomacy includes the Foreign Service officers who specialize in public diplomacy, local staff of public affairs sections worldwide, and post budget for programming.⁶⁰ Public Affairs should be distinct, as indicated in the Defense Department section, but separating the two here is complicated by the State Department's decision to lump them together. Finally, the State Department also maintains the Bureau of International Information Programs (IIP). IIP is the central coordinator of the State Department tools and resources for public diplomacy information, including providing website support and publishing magazines in various languages. Together these activities totaled \$485 million in 2012.

The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) was created to oversee the US's international broadcasting efforts prior to the dissolution of the US Information Agency (USIA) and gained its independence with USIA's dissolution. BBG oversees the five US government-run media activities: the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, and the Middle East Broadcast Networks. These activities represent the historical effort from the Cold War to broadcast truthful information into closed societies and are one of the most common conceptions of public diplomacy. The international broadcasting budget was \$750 million in 2012.

Chart 2: US Information-Based Public Diplomacy-Like Activities



Legend

- DoD Public Diplomacy
- DoD related activities
- Civilian Public Diplomacy
- DoD plausible activities

*Includes military personnel costs, whereas other activities do not.

Source: FY13 Congressional Budget Justifications

Acronyms

- TRWI: Trans-Regional Web Initiative
- CERP: Commander's Emergency Response Program
- OHDACA: Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Assistance
- CCIF: Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund
- BPC: Building Partnership Capacity

The sense of scale provided by this brief review of civilian agencies' budgets supports either of two widely divergent conclusions. Using an inclusive definition that incorporates public affairs and advertising, without even considering electronic warfare and security cooperation, the Defense Department spends about the same as the civilian total, \$1.9 billion a year. A narrow definition, on the other hand, would exclude these activities. The Defense Department still devotes significant resources to public diplomacy-like activities from this perspective but the gap is wider. Specifically, the Defense Department spends \$225 million compared to a combined total of \$1.2 billion between the State Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. In relative terms, that is about half the amount the State Department spends on information-based public diplomacy and just under a third what the Broadcasting Board of Governors spends. Importantly, half of the Defense Department tally is devoted solely to Iraq and Afghanistan, suggesting it is not as enduring as State Department or BBG programs.

The Defense Department has significant activities that resemble public diplomacy. At the same time, those activities do not exceed civilian efforts, nor are they as broad and diffuse the headlines may have suggested. Instead they are concentrated in a specific program, albeit a robust one, and activities within Iraq and Afghanistan.

Part II

Tracing Efforts to Institutionalize Public Diplomacy-like Activities in the Defense Department

The Defense Department's involvement in public diplomacy-like activities is a story with two parts. On one hand, efforts to institutionalize 'information operations' throughout the Department of Defense failed. Institutionalization is the permanent moving of resources – funding or personnel – and that did not happen. On the other hand, several efforts consolidated into a single substantial and coherent program during the same time period. Understanding this outcome begins with a more detailed history of how the two parallel strands developed.

The Push and Failure for Broader Information Operations Institutionalization

Despite a concerted effort especially in the first half of the last decade, public diplomacy-like activities failed to take root throughout the Defense Department. This effort began with the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Bush administration's first significant strategy document and one built under Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. It explicitly stressed Information Operations: "The QDR highlights both the imperative for the United States to maintain an unsurpassed capability to conduct information operations, as well as the need to strengthen US capabilities in these areas."⁶¹ And it did so under the heading of "Transformation Initiatives" as part of the section "Creating the US Military of the 21st Century," emphasizing that these were capabilities the new administration meant to redirect the military toward. But this focus on 'Information Operations' accepted the existing doctrinal definition and thus it also conflated efforts to influence audiences with more technical capabilities like computer network defense and offense. That should come as little surprise given the historical moment—the internet was still relatively new, and Information Operations captured the growing recognition of its power and vulnerabilities.⁶² Despite this confusion, the 2001 QDR clearly did include public diplomacy-like activities via a reference to "the capability to influence perceptions."⁶³

One month later, the Defense Department created the Office of Strategic Influence.⁶⁴ This office marked the beginning of the Pentagon's attempts to institutionalize public diplomacy-like activities. It had dedicated people and resources, as well as future plans that included empowering it to direct resources belonging to other offices. But it was short-lived, a casualty of biting press coverage a few months later. Tellingly,

one observer blamed this collapse not on the public furor, but on internal Defense Department politics: “In a classic example of the internecine battles that have always plagued strategic influence, OSI was sabotaged internally within [the Defense Department] and abolished by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld less than five months after its establishment.”⁶⁵ Thus the Defense Department’s first and most explicit institutionalization of public diplomacy-like activities ended quickly, though Secretary Rumsfeld unrepentantly said the activities must continue and the formal role was transferred to a smaller, but apparently ineffective, office.⁶⁶

Two years later the Defense Department more thoroughly revisited the 2001 QDR’s imperative the release of the 2003 Information Operations Roadmap. The 2003 Roadmap took 78 pages to cover what the 2001 QDR covered in half a page and provided “the Department with a plan to advance the goal of information operations as a core military competency.” As with the QDR, the 2003 Roadmap again grouped both the technical, computer network-based elements of information operations in with public diplomacy-like activities, but it also explicitly addressed the relationship between psychological operations (now MISO), public affairs, and public diplomacy. Ten of the 2003 Roadmap’s 57 recommendations for improving Information Operations were directed at psychological operations and public diplomacy-like activities. Another 14 included psychological operations as part of broader positions on Information Operations policy, resources, and people. Appendix I lists each of them.

Yet despite this focus, many of these recommendations were never institutionalized. The Department of Defense Inspector General found in 2009 that “Although DoD has made strides in advancing IO as a core military competency, deficiencies and shortfalls remain in the oversight management processes.”⁶⁷ More specifically, it stated:

The DoD “Information Operations Roadmap,” October 30, 2003, provided DoD with a plan to advance the goal of having IO as a core military competency. It outlined 57 recommendations specific to IO and assigned responsibility for them to various DoD Component heads, all reporting to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. USD(I) officials stated to us that the related and collateral joint responsibilities hindered enforcing implementation of the 2003 recommendations, and as a result, USD(I) closed them and identified current deficiencies in the IO career force.

The 2003 Roadmap was over as a guidance document just six years after its release., though some of its relevant recommendations had been achieved. The Deputy Secretary of Defense issued a 2004 memorandum designating the Navy Post-Graduate School’s Information Operations Center of Excellence as the Department’s center of excellence.⁶⁸ A November 2005 Defense Department Directive created the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and designated him as the lead for information operations.⁶⁹ A new doctrinal publication on information operations, JP 3-13, came out in 2006.⁷⁰ And in 2007 a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Instruction laid out a Joint Information Operations Policy that fulfilled 5 of the 14 broad recommendations.⁷¹

Progress ended here. The rest of the general recommendations, including the Roadmap's cornerstone ideas, were not fulfilled. No budget category ("virtual major force program") was created, and no information operations career force was established.⁷² So though the definitions and documents were produced, no money or people were moved. These are the essence of institutionalization, and they did not occur.

The 2006 QDR was next to take up the issue, this time under the rubric of strategic communication. The document itself included page talking about the importance of strategic communication, and it also launched a new roadmap for strategic communication. This Strategic Communication Roadmap was released in September 2006.

The 2006 Roadmap focused on institutionalizing a process within the Defense Department, defining roles and responsibilities, and properly resourcing. But only four of 40 tasks under the properly resourcing objective refer to psychological operations despite its prominence in the earlier 2003 Roadmap. The rest primarily addressed Public Affairs. This reflected a 2006 QDR decision to treat psychological operations as within the Special Operations Command's remit, where the mission had been housed since 1987.

The 2006 QDR provided the strategic justification for a significant expansion of SOCOM, calling for an overall increase of 15 percent and specific increases for many of its components. Psychological operations were no exception, with a call for a 33-percent increase. This wealth of resources drove most psychological operations conversations out of strategic communication and back into special operations. Certainly recommendations from the 2003 Roadmap like "enhance the current [psychological operations] force structure" and "modernize [psychological operations] force capabilities" were rolled in. This expansion of SOCOM is an institutional inflection point to which we will return to later.

The most dramatic of the 2006 Roadmap's relevant tasks was to "create a DoD Strategic Communication Integration Group."⁷³ Many of the other Roadmap tasks were assigned to this new, centralized group. The SCIG was formally chartered in September 2006 as a collection of senior leaders, and it had subordinate bodies of staff.⁷⁴ Following this formal entity, the next year the Under Secretary for Policy created a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Support to Public Diplomacy (DASD/SPD) as another formal office for public diplomacy-like guidance.

The SCIG and DASD/SPD were signature events in the Defense Department's push to institutionalize public diplomacy-like activities. But within two years of their founding each of these offices had been closed. The SCIG was shuttered in 2008.⁷⁵ DASD/SPD closed in 2009 because "Experience proved, however, that a DASD-level office was not an effective means for ensuring high-level attention to improving policy-driven strategic communication, and in March 2009 that office was disestablished."⁷⁶ Replacing these more formal bodies was an advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

that chaired a “semiformal body” that uses “a softer, voluntary collaborative approach.”⁷⁷ Semiformal, softer, and voluntary are hardly words of institutionalization.

Closing those offices marked the end and the failure of a nearly decade long effort to institutionalize public diplomacy-like activities throughout most of the Defense Department. The Defense Department remains concerned about making sure that its communications are strategic, but there are no institutionalized public diplomacy-like activities diffused through the Department.

The Rise of a Consolidated Program

In contrast to the failure of broader efforts to institutionalize public diplomacy-like activities throughout the Defense Department, the umbrella program run by SOCOM has become more consolidated and more distinct over the same time period.

This story takes many twists, including multiple name changes. Still three activities pop up over and over, and they remain distinct and relatively constant even as their names change and their performance varies. The three activities are:

1. Military-run news websites, magazines and related activities to influence foreign audiences.
2. A strategic planning cell to coordinate these and other messages.
3. Small teams of military personnel deployed to mostly non-war zone countries to do ‘information operations’ known as MIST teams (Military Information Support Teams).

The story of the first activity, military-run websites, starts in the 1999 Kosovo conflict when EUCOM set up a website, *Balkan-info.com*, to counter Serbian nationalist rhetoric.⁷⁸ This first website served only as an aggregator, posting news stories and information developed elsewhere. By 2002, however, the website had grown into *Southeast European Times* with original reporting and content.⁷⁹

In 2003 EUCOM’s area of operations still included nearly all of Africa, and it began operations in the Trans-Sahara region of North Africa to preempt terrorists that might take advantage of ungoverned terrain in Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.⁸⁰ Drawing on its Balkan experience, in 2004 EUCOM created another website, *Magharebia*, to provide similar original reporting and information tailored to the Trans-Sahara region. By 2006, EUCOM was grouping both websites under an operation it called ASSURED VOICE and was including in it what were known as Military Information Support Teams (MIST).⁸¹

MIST has been used as a term as far back as a 1994 Army field manual, though at the time it clearly referred to traditional and tactical MISO.⁸² It began taking its current shape after 9-11, when these small teams were deployed to embassies around the world

to contribute to strategic or public diplomacy-like engagement. Eighteen of them were active by 2006, although their relationship to the embassy and what they were supposed to achieve remained unclear.⁸³

A strategic planning cell also was active during this time. The 2003 Information Operations roadmap noted that internal defense guidance had called for “creation of a ‘strategic’ PSYOP unit.”⁸⁴ The charge included coordinating with the combatant commands, Joint Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to “ensure... integration with overall US Government themes and messages,” with tasks focused on centrally produced, higher quality, but still traditional MISO operations. The Information Operations Roadmap directed the creation of this cell and dubbed it the Joint Psychological Support Element (JPSE). Contrary to the Roadmap’s intent, however, its tendency towards traditional MISO operations was clearly pronounced by 2005.⁸⁵ The SOCOM commander told Congress that he had envisioned “that we would stand up some teams that I could send to other geographic combatant commanders or a functional combatant commander, where we could send him some expertise to help say, this is what leaflets look like, this is how you develop them, these are the themes that are approved.”⁸⁶ Echoing this sentiment, an outside observer in 2005 noted that the JPSE had become too focused on traditional, tactical MISO, and suggested to fulfill the 2003 roadmap’s intent a new organization would need to be created.⁸⁷

All three of these activities—the websites, MIST teams, and JPSE—would start moving towards each other in 2004. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs testified in 2004 that the Department of Defense would recommend assigning SOCOM the role of coordinating all Defense Department actions against terrorist networks. As part of this new assignment, he said that SOCOM had received approval in March of that year to unify and “synchronize psychological operations across regional boundaries in support of the War on Terrorism.” This mission became part of what was called the trans-regional psychological operations program, which apparently already included the MIST teams.⁸⁸ Leaving its tendencies toward more traditional and tactical psychological operations, JPSE was to be the focal point for these programs. A year later, JPSE was the lead for SOCOM to place messages in “newspapers, websites, radio, television and “novelty items” such as T-shirts and bumper stickers” worldwide.⁸⁹ The Defense Science Board in 2008 stated that SOCOM had expanded its program under the auspices of JPSE, including deployed MIST teams.⁹⁰ Most importantly, SOCOM’s website initiative was run by JPSE as well.

SOCOM had become the synchronizer not just of the broader war on terror, but the websites like those that had first developed in EUCOM. In August 2007, the Deputy Secretary of Defense signed a memorandum providing guidance for “combatant command regional websites tailored to foreign audiences,” just like the ones EUCOM had been running since 2002.⁹¹ Most importantly, though the memo authorized the regional combatant commands to run such websites, it also said that “Combatant commanders will synchronize all website material designed to support Global War on

Terrorism objectives or counter ideological support for terrorism with the US Special Operations Command.” Four new websites launched in the next year. And in October 2008, SOCOM issued a draft request for proposal stating that it was “developing an Internet architecture, the Trans-Regional Web Initiative, which Combatant Commands can use as necessary in support of the Global War on Terror.”⁹² A year and a half later, NORTHCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM all had requested funding for VOICE operations. As a final step in this consolidation, in July 2010, EUCOM’s original websites, *Southeast European Times* and *Magharebia*, moved under SOCOM’s umbrella.⁹³

Before the websites were brought under SOCOM’s umbrella, JPSE had tended toward traditional and tactical MISO despite hopes it would serve as a strategic focal point, likely because such a vague mission did not provide enough guidance to establish day to day tasks. But all of a sudden JPSE had a daily, and strategic, job with the addition of the websites. In 2007, as SOCOM gains responsibility for synchronizing the websites and creates the Trans-Regional Web Initiative, JPSE is turned into a formal command, Joint Military Information Support Command.⁹⁴

Every COCOM has or is pursuing a VOICE operation by 2010, and they fall under the umbrella program run by SOCOM and coordinated by the strategic planning cell at SOCOM headquarters.⁹⁵ In contrast to the Defense Department’s failed efforts at broader institutionalization, the websites flourished and were centralized under SOCOM’s management. These two contrasting threads support the concerns about the Defense Department’s outsized role in public diplomacy-like activities, yet also serve to dampen fears. Most of the Defense Department has not embraced public diplomacy-like activities. Sorting out why these two different outcomes resulted can help us understand which trend is likely to grow.

Why Institutionalization Failed, Yet the Web Programs Consolidated

This catalog and tracing of Defense Department public diplomacy-like activities includes two separate and even competing narratives. In one storyline, little success is made institutionalizing an effort to more proactively conduct ‘information operations.’ In the other, disparate programs, including ones unconnected to the push for more ‘information operations,’ consolidate into a single, relatively cohesive program. This contrast is easier explained than it may first appear.

Most concerns about the Defense Department’s public diplomacy-like activities are rooted in an implicit theory of public organizations: agencies always want to expand.⁹⁶ This implicit theory has two flaws.

First, the Defense Department is not a unitary actor. Rather it is a federation of somewhat autonomous organizations grouped under two different functions: administrative and operational. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986

clarified these two lines of authority. On the administrative side, authority runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the three military departments, which are comprised of the four military services: the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps. The services are responsible for organizing, training, and equipping forces. While nominally headed by the Secretary of their military department, the four star uniformed chiefs have greater authority in practice. On the operational side, authority runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the uniformed combatant commanders, who are responsible for conducting military operations. There are geographic combatant commands—Africa, Central, European, Northern, Pacific, Southern, Northern Commands—and functional combatant commands—Strategic, Transportation, and Special Operations Commands. The organizations within these two lines of authority have different incentives and different goals.

Second, though some bureaucracies do want to expand, not all do. James Q. Wilson noted this empirical flaw and provided a correcting explanation:

The view that all bureaus want larger budgets ignores the fact that there is often a tradeoff between bigger budgets on the one hand and the complexity of tasks, the number of rivals, and the multiplicity of constraints on the other. All else being equal, big budgets are better than small. But all else is not equal. Part of the ‘all else’ I call autonomy...Budget increases that threaten to reduce agency autonomy are often but not always resisted.⁹⁷

These points help explain why the military services did not institutionalize ‘information operations’ even as the COCOMs pursued websites and SOCOM centralized them.

The Military Services

Long histories have made the military services into strong organizations with established and tight senses of mission, which they are loath to clutter. The services have built these missions over many years. The youngest—the Air Force—is formally 65 years old, with another 40 years of antecedent development. The others are hundreds of years old. They have a mechanism, their promotion system, to build dedication to those missions throughout the organization. The system’s primary requirement for promotion is time since the last promotion, and those that do not move “up” through continued promotion are sent “out,” forced to leave the service.⁹⁸ These two aspects combine to create a personnel system that fosters deep loyalty to the services’ organizations and culture. And these strong missions have galvanized reliable external support. Americans hold the most confidence in the military of any American institution.⁹⁹ Over time, this external support has made the military services resource rich. Not only does the Department of Defense have more funding than any other government agency, each of the Military Departments – Army, Navy, and Air Force – all individually have greater discretionary budgets than any other government agency.¹⁰⁰ The services have little to gain and a lot to lose in changing their mission. They are more concerned about preserving their autonomy than expanding.

If the services were to embrace public diplomacy-like activities, they would take on a vague and complex task that does not directly correspond to their primary mission, move themselves into a space that the State Department claims, and open themselves to additional constraints—not least from their political masters. Secretary Rumsfeld’s push to better conduct information operations was explicitly a part of his agenda to “transform US armed forces,” and that was a direct challenge to the military services’ prerogatives.¹⁰¹ Indeed, information operations posed the risk of not just a one-time loss but of an enduring reason to insert political considerations into almost anything the military services did. If the question was what bomb is best to use, the military enjoys highly asymmetric expertise compared to their political masters. But if the question is how best to influence a foreign audience, a political appointee might claim as much expertise as a military officer, or more.¹⁰² We should not be surprised that the military services did little to incorporate public diplomacy into those areas they control, like building career paths or changing their doctrine.

Regional Combatant Commands

The COCOMs are very different organizations. Some have long histories, like PACOM and EUCOM, but they do not generate significant organizational loyalties. Almost everyone who works for a COCOM does so temporarily and has a greater loyalty elsewhere—usually their parent service.

COCOMs also have weak external support. For the regional commands, they may build relationships with the governments or militaries in their region. And, provided they are not pushing the military services somewhere they do not want to go, geographic commands can usually rely on the institutional military’s weight. Their primary support, however, derives from the President whose foreign policy they are executing.

But that support is unreliable because it is hard for the President to explain what he wants from them. The result is a vague mission. Here is EUCOM’s: “The mission of the US European Command is to conduct military operations, international military engagement, and interagency partnering to enhance transatlantic security and defend the United States forward.” And CENTCOM’s: “With national and international partners, US Central Command promotes cooperation among nations, responds to crises, and deters or defeats state and nonstate aggression, and supports development and, when necessary, reconstruction in order to establish the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity.” These goals are open-ended—hard to measure and hard to build specific tasks around. On the whole, their success depends on political conditions far more than traditional military action.

Just as we should not be surprised the military services shy away from public diplomacy-like activities, we should not be surprised that COCOMs embrace them. Already stuck with vague and inherently political missions that embroil them with White House officials and diplomats, they lose little by embracing public diplomacy and may even

increase their autonomy by lessening their dependence on external organizations like the State Department.

SOCOM

Finally, we must consider one other organization separately: the Special Operations Command (SOCOM). SOCOM is unique within the Department of Defense. Formally a unified combatant command, it differs from all others in that its charter also gives it control over resources and people.¹⁰³ With a budget of roughly \$10 billion a year and roughly 70,000 personnel, SOCOM has far fewer resources than the military departments, which have budgets above \$100 billion annually and hundreds of thousands of people, but far more manpower and resources than the other combatant commanders. SOCOM is often called the fifth service because of this disparity even though it also has an operational mission akin to the other COCOMS.

SOCOM's uniqueness was accelerated in the 2000s. Prosecuting the war on terror and enjoying Secretary Rumsfeld's favor, SOCOM took on more and more of a lead role.¹⁰⁴ In 2005 SOCOM's role was formally expanded to include "synchronizing" global operations against terrorist networks.¹⁰⁵ Like the military services, SOCOM has resources and constituencies that would discourage it from complicating or clouding its mission. But like the regional combatant commands, this new mission offers SOCOM an opportunity to add a task that makes it the director rather than the directed. It appears to have taken it. Even though military doctrine does not specify lines of authority or command between "the synchronizer" and "the synchronized," serving as the centralized hub for these activities helps SOCOM solidify its global role.¹⁰⁶ It does not quite tell the regional combatant commanders what to do, but the regional combatant commanders are somewhat dependent on SOCOM.

The rise of regional combatant commands and SOCOM in US foreign policy-making has been chronicled elsewhere, sometimes positively and other times negatively.¹⁰⁷ But clearly from our review of public diplomacy-activities, it is important not to conflate these different actors as part of the broader organization, the Department of Defense. The vast bulk of the Department of Defense, particularly the military services, have resisted efforts to expand or institutionalize public diplomacy-like activities and instead focused on more traditional military missions. However, the regional combatant commands and SOCOM have been willing, and able, to take on these missions and grow them. Thus we can see little public diplomacy-like activity throughout most of the Defense Department and yet also find one concerted program that rivals the efforts of the State Department and Broadcasting Board of Governors.

We can understand the competing narratives of the last decade only when we understand there are different organizations with different incentives within the Defense Department. More importantly, we can understand these distinctions only when we dig for deeper explanations than the military had a 'need' to conduct public

diplomacy in the Global War on Terror. We cannot understand how US foreign policy is being executed—let alone its effects—unless we understand the organizations that are conducting them.

Conclusion

The Department of Defense has not institutionalized public diplomacy-like activities throughout its components, belying both hopes that it would internalize these broader concerns into its everyday activities and fears that the Department's great scale would overwhelm all other US public diplomacy. But the new role of the combatant commands and SOCOM did encourage those particular organizations to develop and consolidate a program that looks very much like public diplomacy. At about half the resources the State Department devotes to information-based public diplomacy, this program is a significant contributor to how the United States is perceived around the world.

Public diplomacy offers a case study in the changing roles of the national security institutions in US foreign policy making in the last few decades. Since the end of World War II, US foreign policy, and especially international affairs programming, was spread throughout US government agencies; partly due to the creation of new agencies, but often because the United States' diplomatic corps fought to focus solely on government to government diplomacy rather than broader aspects of foreign policy.¹⁰⁸ The resulting institutional diaspora meant there was no single place in the US government to turn for foreign policy. However, when the Goldwater-Nichols reforms in the 1980s empowered the combatant commanders as representatives of the President and the United States around the world, in doing so it left them the broad and vague mission of achieving all US national security aims.¹⁰⁹ As the US Foreign Service continues to try and focus only on traditional diplomacy and memo writing, the rise of the combatant commanders now offers a real alternative.¹¹⁰ However, it is not yet clear whether the combatant commands have the organizational staying power to institutionalize programs. Despite their rise, the military services dominate the Defense Department's resourcing process.¹¹¹ And as we have seen, the services are not inclined to institutionalize tasks in support of vague missions like public diplomacy. SOCOM poses an even more unknown quantity. Given its central role in fighting terrorism, it could continue to grow in importance in US foreign policy making. Alternatively, since it is a relatively new organization and has a hybrid nature, it may refocus on narrower, traditionally military tasks. Still, the incentives that led to the rise in the last decade of the military creating public diplomacy-like activities are likely to only have strengthened when the next crisis arises.

We can only understand how our foreign policy outcomes arise when we stop considering them absent the organizations and processes that create those outcomes. Public diplomacy provides intriguing lessons about how these organizations could create outcomes that no amount of debate could anticipate.

Appendix I: 2003 Information Operations Roadmap Recommendations Pertaining to Public Diplomacy

Public Diplomacy-like Activity Specific
6. Enhance and refocus PSYOP capability
7. Improve military support to public diplomacy
8. Support active public affairs programs that influence foreign audiences
9. Develop distinguishing tasks
11. Streamline CNA/PSYOP organizational constructs and C2
47. Coordinate DoD and USG themes and messages
48. Create a Joint PSYOP Support Element
49. Delegate product approval for select categories of PSYOP products
50. Enhance the current PSYOP force structure
51. Modernize PSYOP force capabilities

Relevant General Information Operations	Fulfilled
1. Publish IO policy	2007
2. Adopt a full spectrum concept of IO built upon three broad functions and five core capabilities	2006
3. Approve a definition of IO based upon the full spectrum concept	2006
5. Improve visibility and accountability of IO resources	No
12. Consolidate OSD Oversight of IO	2005
13. Establish an IO career force	No
14. Develop IO planners	No
15. Develop IO capability specialists	No
16. Identify joint and Service IO billets	2009
17. Provide focus for enlisted and civilians	No
18. Monitor career force compliance across DoD	No
19. Integrate IO earlier in education	No
20. Expand/modify current IO training courses and/or develop new ones	No
21. Establish a DoD Center of Excellence for IO	2004

Source: Information Operations Roadmap, Appendix B: IO Roadmap Recommendations, Department of Defense, 2003, p. 70.

Endnotes

- 1 “The US was slow to recognize the importance of information and the battle for the narrative in achieving objectives at all levels.” Theme 3 from “Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations,” Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis, Department of Defense, June 15, 2012, p. 11-14.
- 2 For a review of the literature, see Margaret C. Ayers, “Promoting Public and Private Reinvestment in Cultural Exchange Based-Diplomacy,” Robert Sterling Clark Foundation, April 2010.
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- 4 Kristin Lord, “Voices of America: US Public Diplomacy for the 21st Century,” Foreign Policy at Brookings, November 2008, page 14.
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- 11 For a discussion of the limitations of these definitions, see Christopher Paul, "Strategic Communication is Vague: Say What You Mean," *Joint Force Quarterly*, (56):10-13, 2010
- 12 2009 Department of Defense Report on Strategic Communication, 5: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/DoD%20report%20on%20Strategic%20Communication%20Dec%202009.pdf>.
- 13 Thomas A. Davis, "Strategic Communication: A Departmental Transformation," US Army War College, March 2010.
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- 15 For a review of these efforts, especially the interagency, see Susan Gough, “The Evolution of Strategic Influence,” US Army War College, April 2003.
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- 17 Christopher Paul, “Getting Better at Strategic Communication,” Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities on July 12, 2011, p. 5-6.
- 18 Senate Report 111-74, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 2010, September 10, 2009, p. 36.
- 19 “Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” *Joint Chiefs of Staff*, As Amended Through 15 August 2012, pg. 150: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. Until the release of SecDef Memo 12401-10 on 25 January 2011, information operations’ doctrinal definition included, rather than just associating with, these five capabilities. See “Information Operations Primer, AY12 Edition,” *US Army War College*, November 2011, pg. 55: <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/dime/documents/AY12%20IO%20Primer%20FINAL%20CD.pdf>.
- 20 JP 1-02 (2012), pg. 233
- 21 JP 1-02 (2012), pg. 102
- 22 As with all of these examples, there is not a clear demarcation. During the Rwandan genocide, one of the debates was whether or not to jam hate radio broadcasts. Such an action is closer to the definitions and intent of public diplomacy, though still in the negative—preventing a message from being spread rather than spreading a message. More interestingly, the platform primarily considered, Commando Solo, is usually classed as a MISO capability and will be discussed later. See Alison Des Forges, “Call to Genocide: Radio in Rwanda, 1994.” In Allan Thompson, ed, *The Media and the Rwandan Genocide*. (Pluto Press: 2007) for a discussion of the proposal to jam the radio stations.
- 23 Michele Malvesti notes this division in “To Serve the Nation: US Special Operations Forces in an Era of Persistent Conflict,” Center for a New National Security, June 2010, p. 14.
- 24 This construct was first created in the 1996 version of DoD Directive S-3600.1, “Information Operations.” That directive noted that related activities to IO include public affairs and civil military operations, blurring the lines between the technical aspects of IO and its influence aspects almost immediately.
- 25 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs OASD(PA) website, <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/almanac/asdpa.aspx>, accessed August 15, 2012.
- 26 FY13 Defense Media Activity Congressional Budget Justification, p. DMA-341.
- 27 This statement is, of course, a gross generalization and ignores the debates within the Public Affairs community on the role of Public Affairs, and how much it plays in strategic communication. For an example of this internal debate—outside of just the national security realm, see “Integrating Strategic Communication with Public Affairs: When Public Affairs, Public Relations and Issues Management Converge,” 2nd Annual Grunig Lecture, October 1, 2009, especially Douglas G. Pinkham’s lecture.
- 28 For a review of DoD’s effort to better its advertising see: “DOD Needs to Establish Objectives and Measures to Better Evaluate Advertising’s Effectiveness,” Government Accountability Office, September 2003 and Paul R. Sackett and Anne S. Mavor, Eds, ‘Evaluating Military Advertising and Recruiting: Theory and Methodology,’ Committee on the Youth Population and Military Recruitment -- Phase II, National Research Council, National Academies Press, 2004.
- 29 FY13 Department of Defense Operations and Maintenance Overview, “Advertising,” page 148
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- for Building Partner Stability Capacity for Stability Operations,” (RAND: 2010). For a call to arms for BPC see: Robert M. Gates, “Helping Others Defend Themselves: The Future of US Security Assistance,” *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2010. For a comparison of how the BPC conversation reflects the debate about peacetime engagement, see the two articles: Randal Walsh, “Security Cooperation: A New Functional Command,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, January 2012 and Paul Marks, “Peacetime Engagement: A Role for Military Advisors?,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 2000.
- 31 The 2006 QDR Roadmap, “Building Partnership Capacity,” covered these issues, but also included a review of how the Defense Department could support other US government agencies and the interagency process. This aspect is not considered here.
 - 32 See *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Vol 29, No. 1, February 2007.
 - 33 10 USC §184
 - 34 “Regional Centers,” National Defense University Foundation website, <http://www.ndufoundation.org/page.aspx?pid=373>, accessed August 31, 2012.
 - 35 Sara Bette Franken, “Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellows Program,” *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, Fall 2003.
 - 36 For descriptions of these programs see Appendix I, Gordon Adams and Rebecca Williams, “A New Way Forward: Rebalancing Security Assistance Programs and Authorities,” Stimson: 2011 or “Campaign Support Plan 2010,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, January 1, 2010 or “Department of Defense Section 1209 and 1203(b) Report to Congress on Foreign-Assistance Related Programs for FY08, 09, and 10,” Department of Defense, April 2012.
 - 37 Eugene Bonventre, Kathleen Hicks, and Stacy Okutani, “US National Security and Global Health: An Analysis of Global Health Engagement by the US Department of Defense, (CSIS: 2009) and Edilberto Salenga, “Developing Soft Power Using Afloat Medical Capacity,” (US Army War College: 2009)
 - 38 Thomas Dolan, “The Seabees’ Humanitarian Water Well Teams: Global Efforts Bring Water to Nations in Need,” *Water Well Journal*, July 1, 2011 and Kristin McHugh, “Building Not Fighting: US Military in Djibouti Takes Softer Approach to Counterterrorism,” The Stanley Foundation.
 - 39 “Money As a Weapon System Afghanistan,” USFOR-A Pub 1-06, CERP SOP, February 2011.
 - 40 Note that the standard operating procedures governing the use of CERP explicitly states that CERP is unauthorized for “Conducting psychological operations, information operations, or other US, Coalition, or Afghan Security Force operations.” *Ibid*, p. 18. But in practice, the argument that the population’s opinion of Americans will improve is important. See Dana Hedgpeth and Sarah Cohen, “Money as a Weapon,” *The Washington Post*, August 11, 2008. Also see Jason Condrey, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program: A Model for Future Implementation,” School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2010, pages 43-44 and Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, “Iraq Reconstruction Special Report: Reconstruction Leaders’ Perceptions of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq,” April 2012, page 23.
 - 41 Hedgpeth and Cohen (August 11, 2008)
 - 42 Csrnko, Thomas. “Memorandum for All Soldiers and Civilians Associated with the Psychological Operations Regiment,” 23 June 2010: <https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B2k5Ww3Ah1I5NDMwN2MzZmEtZGRlMS00ZTM1LWJjZWQtdmV1NTk3MDhmNzJk/edit?hl=en>. See also Marc Ambinder, “Original Document: Making PSYOPS Less Sinister,” *The Atlantic*, June 30, 2010, <http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/06/original-document-making-psyops-less-sinister/58947/> For arguments about whether the name change signifies greater significance, see for the downplaying of its significance, Alfred Paddock, “Legitimizing Army Psychological Operations,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, 1st Quarter 2010 and for emphasizing its significance, see Curtis Boyd, “The Future of MISO,” *Special Warfare*, January-February 2011.

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- 45 Neither the PAANG generally nor the 193rd SOW specifically appear to report the unit's size. PAANG does note that it is 4,000 personnel strong in total and that it includes three wings, of which one is the 193rd SOW. It is an inference that personnel are evenly distributed among these wings, giving 1,334 to the 193rd SOW. See <http://pa.ng.mil/ang/Pages/default.aspx>.
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- 56 Nick Fielding and Ian Cobain, “Revealed: US Spy Operation that Manipulates Social Media,” *The Guardian*, March 17, 2011.
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- 59 Interagency Working Group on US Government-Sponsored International Exchanges and Training, FY2011 Annual Report.
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- 61 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, Department of Defense, p. 43.
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- 64 “New Pentagon office to spearhead information war,” CNN Radio, February 19, 2002.
- 65 Susan Gough, “The Evolution of Strategic Influence.” ‘US Army War College’, April 7, 2003, p. 31. Gough also provides the most in-depth coverage of the office, what it did and what happened to it, based off interviews with the officials involved.
- 66 Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld Media Availability En Route to Chile,” November 18, 2002, <http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3296>. Gough describes the impotence of the smaller office.
- 67 Inspector General, “Information Operations Career Force Management,” Department of Defense, Report No. D-2009-090, July 2, 2009
- 68 Enclosure 1, DoD Instruction, “Joint Information Operations (IO) Education,” November 4, 2005.
- 69 DoD Directive 5143.01, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), November 23, 2005
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- 71 CJCSI 3210.01B, Joint IO Policy, January 2007
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- 74 Lindsey Borg, “Communicating with Intent: The Department of Defense and Strategic Communication,” Program on Information Resources Policy, Center for Information Policy Research, Harvard University, February 2008, p. 21-23.
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- 76 Report on Strategic Communication, Department of Defense, December 2009.
- 77 Christopher Paul, Strategic Communication: Origins, Concepts, and Current Debates, (Praeger: 2011), p. 90.
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- 79 Ibid.
- 80 Alex Belida, “US Counterterrorism Training for W. Africa Gets Under Way,” *Voice of America*, November 14, 2003.
- 81 Charles Wald, “The Phase Zero Campaign,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, 4th Quarter, 2006.
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- 83 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Embassies as Command Posts in the Anti-Terror Campaign,” Senate Report 109-52, December 15, 2006.
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- 85 General Bryan Brown, “Emerging Threats and Capabilities,” Hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 9, 2003.
- 86 General Bryan Brown, “US Special Operations Command,” Hearing before the Emerging Threats and Capabilities subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 22, 2005.
- 87 Christopher Lamb, Review of Psychological Operations Lessons Learned from Recent Operational Experience, (National Defense University Press: 2005), p. 135
- 88 General Richard Myers, Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee,” May 12, 2004.
- 89 Matt Kelley, “Pentagon Rolls Out Stealth PR,” USA Today, December 14, 2005.
- 90 Task Force on Strategic Communication, Defense Science Board, January 2008, p. 9.
- 91 Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Policy for Combatant Command Regional Websites Tailored to Foreign Audiences,” Memorandum, August 3, 2007. This policy memo followed another one in July that provided guidance for interactive websites. Interactive websites being blogs and other social networking sites. That memo laid out policy both for public affairs interaction with servicemembers and the general public, and other internet activities intentionally set to foil adversaries. Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Policy for DoD Interactive Internet Activities,” June 8, 2007.
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- 96 The closest explicit theory to this common assertion is the work of William Niskanen, who argued bureaucracies want to maximize their resources. Anthony Downs offered a different approach, focusing on the desire of organizations to aggrandize in order to protect their territory. Downs introduces the idea that the desire to aggrandize is not constant; that imperialism is only one possible reaction. Anthony Downs, *Inside Bureaucracy*, (Little, Brown: 1979), p. 198-200.
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- 99 Gallup Poll, "Confidence In Institutions," June 7-10, 2012, <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx#1>
- 100 FY13 OMB Historical Table 5.4
- 101 Donald Rumsfeld, "Transforming the Military," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2002. For a discussion of how these euphemisms hid direct assaults on the military services' prerogatives, see Caitlin Talmadge, "Transforming the Pentagon: McNamara, Rumsfeld and the Politics of Change," *Breakthroughs*, Spring 2006, p. 12-20.
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- 103 Susan Marquis, *Unconventional Warfare*, (Brookings: 1997)
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- 105 Admiral Eric T. Olson, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 4, 2008.
- 106 JP 1-02, which cites JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence Planning as the source for defining the term.
- 107 For the combatant commands, see Dana Priest, *The Mission: Waging War and Keeping Peace with America's Military*, (WW Norton & Co: 2003). For a positive discussion of the rise of SOCOM, see Michele Malvesti, "To Serve the Nation," Center for a New American Security, 2010. For a negative discussion, see Jennifer Kibbe, "The Rise of the Shadow Warriors." *Foreign Affairs* 83 (2): 102-115, 2004.
- 108 Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, *Buying National Security: How American Plans and Pays for its Global Role and Safety at Home*, (Taylor and Francis: 2009), p. 227.
- 109 This change in the combatant commanders' roles has been largely neglected, as it was obscured for the first 10 years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The Act had also sought to empower the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and when General Colin Powell served in this position, especially during the first Gulf War and the early years of the crises in the Balkans, his personal presence overshadowed the deeper impact of Goldwater-Nichols on the combatant commands. Only in the last 15 years has this change become visible. Dana Priest in her book, *The Mission*, first articulated this new power in US foreign policymaking. For more information, see Derek S. Reveron and Michelle D. Gavin, "America's Viceroy's," in Derek Reveron, ed, *America's Viceroy's: The Military and US Foreign Policy*, (MacMillan: 2007)
- 110 For more on the Foreign Service, see Kori Schake, *State of Disrepair: Fixing the Culture and Practices of the State Department*, (Hoover Institute Press: 2012).
- 111 Jim Cooper and Russell Rumbaugh, "Real Acquisition Reform," *Joint Force Quarterly*, 4th Quarter, 2009.

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