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Israeli Public Opinion after the November 2012 Gaza War

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METHODOLOGY

The poll was conducted on November 21 and November 24-25, 2012, through telephone interviews with a sample of 600 adult Israelis (510 Israeli Jews and 90 Israeli Arabs). The margin of error for the full sample is +/-4.0%. The survey was fielded by the Dahaf Institute in Israel. Of the 510 interviews with Israeli Jews, 156 were obtained on November 21 in the hours before the ceasefire took effect at 9 pm that evening. The Jewish subsample was weighted to match political participation in the 2009 Israeli Knesset election.

The Following are the findings from a nationally representative poll of 600 Israelis conducted on November 21, 25, and 26, 2012:

Gaza War

Less than half of Israelis believe that Israel made strategic gains or prevailed in the Gaza conflict. The most common view is that neither Israel nor Hamas came out ahead. Few believe that a military campaign or reoccupation of Gaza will end the fighting between Israel and the Palestinian groups. Views recorded before and after the ceasefire were not significantly different. Israelis express pessimism that the use of military force will succeed in ending the conflict in Gaza.

Fewer than half of Israelis believe that Israel made strategic gains in the Gaza conflict of mid-November, 2012. Asked whether they thought Israel is “better or worse off than before the escalation,” only 36% answered that Israel was better off. Fifty-nine percent felt that Israel was either about the same (38%) or worse off (21%).¹

Less than half believe that Israel prevailed in the immediate combat--apart from the issue of its strategic value. Just 40% said Israel “won the combat in the Gaza Strip.” A majority said that neither side won (45%) or that Hamas won (11%).²

Approximately a quarter of the sample was polled before the ceasefire, while the rest were polled after, affording the possibility of comparing the affect of the ceasefire. There were some slight changes with Israeli Jews becoming less positive about the post escalation outcome, and less confident that Israel won, but these changes were not statistically significant.

Few believe that a military campaign or reoccupation of Gaza will end the fighting between Israel and the Palestinian groups. Respondents were asked to assess the prospects for an end to this long-running conflict and were given four options. Only 27% said that “the fighting between Israel and Palestinian groups in Gaza” will end only through “a major Israeli military campaign” (15%) or “only if Israel reoccupies Gaza” (12%). A much larger 69% said either that the conflict simply will not end (40%), or will end only through a political final status agreement with the Palestinians (29%).³

US-Israeli Relations

Overall there are some warming trends in Israeli views in relation to the United States. Views of Obama are now quite positive, with 60 percent expressing favorable views—up 6 points from the previous year (and 8 points among Jewish Israelis). Asked which world leader they most admire, among Israeli Jews Obama is now the most frequently cited. More Israelis see American public support for Israeli security interests as having increased than see it as having decreased over the least few years, and more are optimistic than are pessimistic about US-Israel relations in Obama’s second term.

Israeli attitudes toward the United States show some distinct warming trends, notably in their views toward the reelected U.S. President. Israelis' positive views of President Obama are now fairly strong at 60% (16% very positive). Among Israeli Jews, positive views have risen over the last year from 54 to 62%.⁴ When Israelis were asked to name which foreign world leader they most admired, Obama got the second most mentions (13%, after Angela Merkel at 14%).

For Israeli Jews, mentions of Obama showed a striking 9-point rise from when the question was last asked in November 2011 (from 6 to 15%)—making Obama the most frequently cited world leader.⁵

When asked to think about the American public's support for Israel's security interests over the last few years, more Israelis see it as having increased than having decreased. Forty percent said that "over the last few years... support for Israel's security needs" has increased, while only 21% said it has decreased. Another 36% thought it has stayed about the same.⁶

Asked the same question about US public "support for Israel government policies," a lesser 30 percent thought this has increased, and almost as many (27%) thought it has decreased; 40% thought it has remained the same.⁷

More Israelis are optimistic than are pessimistic about US-Israel relations in Obama's second term. Asked whether these relations would "get warmer, stay about the same, or get cooler," 26% thought relations would warm and only 14% thought they would cool; 55% thought there would be little change.

Six in ten perceive that Netanyahu supported Romney in the presidential election—just 16% think he stayed neutral. Nonetheless, 60% said that "the personal relationship" between Obama and Netanyahu would "not make much difference" to American support for Israel, and those who predict that the relationship will increase support (23%) substantially outweighed those who said it would diminish support (11%).^{8 9 10}

Iran's Nuclear Program

Concerns about Iran appear to have moderated a bit. While a majority of Israelis thinks it is very likely that Iran will develop nuclear weapons, among Israeli Jews this is down 8 points over the last year. Opposition to a military attack against Iran's nuclear facilities has risen modestly, and only one in five Israelis now favor attacking without US support. Only one in four believe that an attack would delay Iran's ability for more than five years. A substantial majority of Israelis favor a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone that would include Israel, though among Israeli Jews this is down a bit from a year ago. Israelis are divided on a possible UN deal whereby Iran would be allowed to enrich uranium at low levels provided that it allows intrusive inspections to ensure that it is not developing nuclear weapons.

Israelis continue to show a pessimistic view in regard to the likelihood that Iran will develop nuclear weapons. Asked “How likely do you think it is that Iran will eventually develop nuclear weapons?” 51% of Israelis called it very likely, with another 36% calling it somewhat likely (not very likely, 7%; not at all likely, 3%).

However there has been an eight point drop among Israeli Jews holding this pessimistic view over the last year, with the number saying it is very likely dropping from 62% in 2011 to 54 percent today.¹¹

Reminded that “there is talk of a possible Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities” and asked whether they would support or oppose it, half of Israelis overall (50%) oppose such an attack while 38% support it.

Among Israeli Jews opposition has risen from 41% a year ago to 46% today, with 41% now supporting it.¹²

But when asked explicitly in another question about whether to proceed with an attack unilaterally, only with U.S. support, or not at all, only one in five Israelis favor proceeding without US support. Among Israeli Jews, those ready to proceed without US support has dropped from 22% a year ago to 18% now.¹³

Given the importance to Israelis of not acting alone, it is interesting to note Israelis’ expectations of how the US would react if Israel did go ahead with a strike on Iranian facilities. Only one in four Israelis (24%) think the US “would join the war on Israel’s behalf.” Almost half (46%) think the US “would support Israel diplomatically, but not provide military assistance.” Another quarter thought the US would either stay neutral (14%) or “would punish Israel by withdrawing its current support” (11%).

Among Israeli Jews, it should be noted that those expecting the US would join Israel in fighting have dropped from 28 to 21% over the last year.¹⁴

Only one in four Israelis believe that a military attack would delay Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons by more than five years [see chart].

But there has been some increase among Israeli Jews in the belief that it would have some effect. The number of Israelis who think a strike would create a one-to-two year delay in Iran’s capabilities has risen from 9 to 19%; those who would expect a three-to-five year delay have also risen slightly, from 22% to 26%. However, those who would expect a delay longer than five years were stable at 23%. Another fifth thought a strike would either have no effect (8%, down from 19%) or would accelerate Iran’s program (11%, unchanged).¹⁵

Middle East Nuclear Free Zone

A substantial majority of Israelis favor a Middle East Nuclear Free Zone that would include Israel, though among Israeli Jews this is down a bit from a year ago.

This issue was presented to respondents in three separate questions: one about an initial agreement to a system of full international inspections, including Iran and Israel; second, about a commitment by all countries in the region to not have nuclear weapons; and third, a question that summarized the whole plan. All questions received majority support (55-58%). For the summary question, support among Israeli Jews was 58%, down slightly from 64% in 2011. [NOTE from Clay: I suggest full text of the summary question be in a fairly large graph, not just a small one on the margin]¹⁶

Possible Agreement with Iran

Israelis are divided on a possible UN deal whereby Iran would be allowed to enrich uranium at low levels, provided that it allows intrusive inspections to ensure that it is not developing nuclear weapons. Respondents were reminded that “there is some talk about possible negotiations between Iran and the United States about Iran’s nuclear program” and asked to consider the following proposal:

If Iran were to allow UN inspectors permanent and full access throughout Iran, to make sure it is not developing nuclear weapons, do you think Iran should or should not be allowed to produce low level nuclear fuel that could only be used for producing electricity?

Forty-six percent of Israelis said they would approve such a deal, while 47 percent said they would not.¹⁷

Syria

Israelis have mixed views about the possibility of the Syrian opposition gaining power. Four in ten say that it would be worse for Israel, while three in ten say it would be better. Only one in four perceive the uprising in Syria as primarily about Islamist groups trying to take power.

Respondents were asked, “If the Syrian opposition were to gain power, as compared to the Assad regime, do you think this would be better for Israel or worse for Israel?” Four in ten (42%) said such a shift would be worse for Israel, while three in ten (30%) said it would be better. A large number either did not give an answer (18%) or volunteered that there would be no difference (11%).¹⁸

However, Israelis do not particularly see the turmoil as fundamentally a political Islamist struggle. Respondents were asked whether they would characterize the conflict as “mostly about ordinary Syrians seeking freedom from a repressive regime,” as “mostly about Islamist groups trying to take power, or as a “civil war among ethnic factions.” Just 27% said it was mostly about Islamist groups trying to gain power, while the most common answer (37%) was that the conflict was mostly about ordinary Syrians’ aspirations. Another 28% said it was primarily an ethnic conflict.¹⁹

Egypt

A modest majority of Israelis perceive the Arab Spring as being mostly for the worse for Israel. At the same time very few expect the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty to be terminated, though a plurality believe it will be modified. Half say that Egyptian President Morsi's policies toward Israel have been what they expected, though a few more say they have been worse than say they have been better.

A bare majority of Israelis (51%) see the changes brought by the Arab Spring as worsening Israel's situation, while just 15% see it as being for the better. Twenty one percent see no difference.

Among Israeli Jews there has been a slight increase in pessimism: last year 51% saw the Arab Spring's impact on Israel as for the worse, now up four points to 55%.²⁰

Nonetheless, most expect the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty will survive, perhaps with changes in its terms. Asked to think about the treaty over next four years, only 17% say the treaty will be terminated. Forty-one percent say it will remain in force but will be modified, and another 36% say it will remain in force in its present form.²¹

Up to this point, the policies of the new Egyptian president Mohamed Morsi have not been a source of shock for Israelis. Asked whether his policies toward Israel have been better or worse than—or about the same as—the respondent expected, almost half (48%) expressed their lack of surprise. Slightly more found Morsi's policies worse than they expected (23%) than found them better than they expected (17%).²²

The Palestinian Issue

A majority of Israelis say that they are ready to at least accept as the basis for negotiation the Arab Peace Initiative, whereby Israel withdraws to 1967 borders and a peace agreement is established with all Arab states. Expressions of readiness to accept the basic conditions of such a deal, though, have declined from last year among Israeli Jews and there is growing pessimism that a lasting peace with the Palestinians can be established. Views are mixed about the consequences should prospects of two-state solution collapse.

Respondents were reminded that “In 2002, Arab countries offered the Arab Peace Initiative, a comprehensive peace deal with Israel based on Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in the 1967 war and full peace agreements between Israel and all Arab states.” They were then asked to consider the possibility of this offer being renewed “with support from Egypt's new government,” and asked how the Israeli government should react. Fifty-two percent said the government should either “accept the offer as the basis for negotiation” (39%) or “accept the offer as proposed” (13%). Four in ten (42%) said the Israeli government should reject it. Among Israeli Jews 50% said that the government should either accept the offer as a basis for negotiation (43%) or simply accept it (7%).²³

At the same time, though, Israel Jewish readiness to accept such a deal's basic conditions have declined over the past year. In a different question respondents were asked to choose between two statements or to reject both of them. Just 33% of Israeli Jews chose the one saying "I am prepared for...peace with the Arabs based on the 1967 borders with agreed modifications and the establishment of a peaceful Palestinian state"—down 10 points from November 2011. (It must be remembered that the poll was fielded at the end and immediately after a week of combat with Gaza, a time when many Israelis may have been unready to revisit the broad outlines of the Palestinian conflict.) Thirty percent of Israeli Jews chose the statement saying that "even if all the Arab states accept and recognize Israel, I still oppose" such a deal (no change from 2011). A large number declined to choose either statement--33%, up from 24%.²⁴

There is substantial pessimism that a lasting peace with the Palestinians can be established in the near future. Asked about the prospects for this, a majority of Israelis say "I don't believe it will ever happen,"(51%) while another 40% say "it is inevitable but it will take more time." Only 4% thought it would happen in the next five years.²⁵

Pessimism seems to be growing. Among Israeli Jews those saying peace will never happen rose from 49 to 55% over the last year.

Views are mixed about the consequences should prospects of two-state solution collapse. Respondents were offered four options. Almost equal numbers said that if the two-state solution idea collapses, "the status quo will continue with little change" (37%), or that this "will lead to a state of intense conflict for years to come" (35%). Only 13% thought the result would be a one-state solution, and only 6% thought "Palestinians will eventually surrender to Israeli power, give up and integrate into other societies."²⁶

The Role of Judaism in Israeli Society

Israelis have mixed views about the role of Judaism in their identity and in Israeli society in general. Half of Israeli Jews say that being Jewish is their most important identity, while for about a third being an Israeli is their most important identity. Views are evenly divided among Israeli Jews about whether the Jewish identity or the democracy of Israel is more important. Few Israelis believe that Arab citizens have full equality with Jewish citizens, though most believe that the discrimination is institutional and social rather than legal.

When Israeli Jews were asked about their primary sense of identity, there was no clear majority view. More focused on their Jewish identity (50%) than focused on their Israeli identity (37%); another 12% instead described themselves as citizens of the world (9%) or pointed to their families' countries of origin (3%).²⁷ [Note: We have not pointed out the sharp difference from a year ago as we do not have any idea how to interpret it. From a social science perspective its instability challenges the validity of the measure as this is not supposed to be the kind of thing that changes from year to year. But maybe you have a theory about why it would change.]

There is an extensive ongoing debate in Israel about the comparative importance of Jewish identity and democracy in the makeup of Israel's national identity. The views of Israeli Jews on this debate appear quite evenly divided. Thirty three percent chose the statement that "The democracy of Israel is more important to me than its Jewishness," while 31% put Jewish identity first. Thirty five percent would not choose one over the other, saying "both are equally important to me."²⁸

Few Israelis believe that Arab citizens have full equality with Jewish citizens, though most believe that the discrimination is institutional and social rather than legal. A majority of 55% chose a description of Israel as having "legal equality, but institutional and societal discrimination" regarding its Arab citizens. A quarter (28%) said there is full equality between Arab and Jewish citizens; at the other end of the spectrum, only 12% chose to call the situation an "apartheid relationship."²⁹

¹ Regarding what is happening these days, do you think Israel is better or worse off than before the escalation in the Gaza strip front?

Better.....	36%
Israeli Jews.....	38
Worse.....	21
Israeli Jews.....	16
The same.....	38
Israeli Jews.....	42
Don't know/Refused.....	5

² Who, in your opinion, won the combat in the Gaza strip?

Israel.....	40%
Israeli Jews.....	44
Hamas.....	11
Israeli Jews.....	10
Neither.....	45
Israeli Jews.....	44
Don't know/Refused.....	5

³ Q1. Do you believe that the fighting between Israel and Palestinian groups in Gaza:

Will end for good only when there is a political final status agreement with the Palestinians.....	29%
Israeli Jews.....	27
Will end only through a major Israeli military campaign in Gaza.....	15
Israeli Jews.....	15
Will end only if Israel reoccupies Gaza.....	12
Israeli Jews.....	13
It will not end.....	40
Israeli Jews.....	42
Don't know/Refused.....	4

⁴ Q9. How would you describe your views of President Barack Obama of the United States?

	11/12	11/11
Very positive	16%	
Israeli Jews	13	6%
Somewhat positive	44	
Israeli Jews	49	48
Somewhat negative	20	
Israeli Jews	21	10
Very negative	12	
Israeli Jews	9	29
Don't know/Refused	8	7

⁵ Q10. Which world leader (outside your own country) do you admire most? [Open-ended]

	11/12	11/11
Angela Merkel	14%	
Israeli Jews	14	12%
Barack Obama	13	
Israeli Jews	15	6
Bill Clinton	5	
Israeli Jews	6	10
Vladimir Putin	3	
Israeli Jews	2	2
Stephen Harper	3	
Israeli Jews	3	1
Hassan Nasrallah	1	
Israeli Jews	0	
Mohamed Morsi	1	
Israeli Jews	0	
No one	25	
Israeli Jews	23	13

Other	35	
Israeli Jews.....	37	52
Don't know/Refused	21	25

⁶ Q4_2. Support for Israel's security needs is:

Increased	40%
Israeli Jews.....	34
Decreased	21
Israeli Jews.....	23
Stayed about the same.....	36
Israeli Jews.....	39
Don't know/Refused	4

⁷ Q4. STATEMENT: Thinking about the American public is it your impression that its support for the following has increased, decreased, or stayed about the same over the last few years.

Q4_1. Support for Israeli government policies:

Increased	30%
Israeli Jews.....	23
Decreased	27
Israeli Jews.....	29
Stayed about the same.....	40
Israeli Jews.....	44
Israeli Arabs	19
Don't know/Refused	4

⁸ Q7. In its second term, do you expect the Obama administration's relations with Israel to:

[Alternate Reverse Order the response options]

Get Warmer.....	26%
Israeli Jews.....	24
Stay about the same	55
Israeli Jews.....	59

Get Cooler	14
Israeli Jews	13
Depends on who is elected in Israel.....	3
Israeli Jews	1
Don't know/Refused	2

⁹ Q8. In President Obama's second term, how do you think the personal relationship between Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Obama will affect American support for Israel? Do you think it will:

Increase American support	23%
Israeli Jews	21
Will not make much difference.....	60
Israeli Jews	62
Diminish American support	11
Israeli Jews	10
Don't know/Refused	6

¹⁰ Q5. Is it your impression that during the American Presidential elections, Prime Minister Netanyahu:

Supported the Republican candidate Mitt Romney	61%
Israeli Jews	64
Supported the Democratic candidate, President Obama.....	12
Israeli Jews	9
Stayed neutral.....	16
Israeli Jews	18
Don't know/Refused	10

¹¹ Q18. How likely do you think it is that Iran will eventually develop nuclear weapons?

Very likely	11/12	11/11
Israeli Jews	51%	62%
Israeli Jews	54	
Somewhat likely.....	36	
Israeli Jews	38	28

Not very likely	7	
Israeli Jews.....	5	4
Not at all likely.....	3	
Israeli Jews.....	1	2
Don't know/Refused	4	4

¹² Q16. There is talk of a possible Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities. Do you:

	11/12	11/11
Support such an attack	38%	
Israeli Jews.....	41	43%
Oppose such an attack.....	50	
Israeli Jews.....	46	41
Don't know/Refused	13	16

¹³ Q24. In regard to a possible Israeli military strike against Iran's nuclear facilities, what do you think Israel should do:

	11/12	2/12¹³
Strike Iran's nuclear facilities, even without the support of the U.S.	20%	19%
Israeli Jews.....	18	22
Strike Iran's nuclear facilities, but only if Israel gains American support	43	42
Israeli Jews.....	46	43
Do not strike Iran's nuclear facilities.....	33	34
Israeli Jews.....	32	32
Don't know/Refused	5	5

¹⁴ Q26. Given American's recommendation that Israel not strike Iran, what do you believe the U.S. government's reaction would be if Israel strikes anyway:

	11/12	2/12
It would join the war on Israel's behalf	24%	27%
Israeli Jews.....	21	28
It would support Israel diplomatically, but not provide military assistance	46	39

Israeli Jews.....	49	37
It would stay neutral.....	14	14
Israeli Jews.....	14	16
It would punish Israel by withdrawing its current support to Israel.....	11	15
Israeli Jews.....	12	16
Don't know/Refused.....	5	5

¹⁵ Q25. What do you believe the likely outcome would be if Israel strikes Iran:

	11/12	2/12
It would delay Iran's capabilities to develop nuclear weapons by 1-2 years.....	19%	9%
Israeli Jews.....	15	10
It would delay Iran's capabilities by 3-5 years.....	26	22
Israeli Jews.....	27	25
It would delay Iran's capabilities by more than 5 years.....	23	22
Israeli Jews.....	25	19
It would accelerate Iran's nuclear program.....	11	11
Israeli Jews.....	11	12
It would have no effect on Iran's nuclear program.....	8	19
Israeli Jews.....	9	21
Don't know/Refused.....	13	9

¹⁶ Statement: Now I would like you to consider a possible international agreement for making the Middle East region a zone free of nuclear weapons. Here is how it would work.

Q33. First, all countries in the region, including Iran and Israel, would agree to have a system of full international inspections of all facilities where nuclear components could be built or maintained. Would you favor or oppose such international inspections? Is that strongly or somewhat?

	11/12	11/11
Strongly favor.....	26%	
Israeli Jews.....	22	29%

Somewhat favor	29	
Israeli Jews.....	31	31
Somewhat oppose	17	
Israeli Jews.....	18	16
Strongly oppose	24	
Israeli Jews.....	25	18
Don't know/Refused	4	5

Q34. Second, once the effectiveness of this inspection system was fully demonstrated to all countries involved, then all countries in the region, including Iran and Israel, would commit to not having nuclear weapons. Would you favor or oppose such a commitment? Is that strongly or somewhat?

	11/12	11/11
Strongly favor	28%	
Israeli Jews.....	23	31%
Somewhat favor	27	
Israeli Jews.....	29	32
Somewhat oppose	18	
Israeli Jews.....	18	14
Strongly oppose	20	
Israeli Jews.....	23	17
Don't know/Refused	8	6

Q35. So finally, I would like you to consider a possible international agreement for making the Middle East region a zone free of nuclear weapons. First, all countries in the region, including Iran and Israel, would agree to have a system of full international inspections of all facilities where nuclear components could be built or maintained. Once the effectiveness of this inspection system was fully demonstrated to all countries involved, then all countries in the region, including Iran and Israel, would commit to not having nuclear weapons. So now, do you favor or oppose the idea of having a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East that would include both Islamic countries and Israel? [Do you feel that way strongly or somewhat?]

	11/12	11/11
Strongly favor	29%	
Israeli Jews.....	27	35%

Somewhat favor	29	
Israeli Jews.....	31	29
Somewhat oppose	15	
Israeli Jews.....	14	15
Strongly oppose	20	
Israeli Jews.....	22	16
Don't know/Refused	7	6

¹⁷ Q27. As you may know, there is some talk about possible negotiations between Iran and the United States about Iran's nuclear program. If Iran were to allow UN inspectors permanent and full access throughout Iran, to make sure it is not developing nuclear weapons, do you think Iran should or should not be allowed to produce low level nuclear fuel that could only be used for producing electricity?

Should be allowed.....	46%
Israeli Jews.....	44
Should not be allowed.....	47
Israeli Jews.....	51
Don't know/Refused	7

¹⁸ Q2. If the Syrian opposition were to gain power, as compared to the Assad regime, do you think this would be better for Israel or worse for Israel?

Better for Israel	30%
Israeli Jews.....	28
Worse for Israel.....	42
Israeli Jews.....	42
It won't make a difference	11
Israeli Jews.....	10
Don't know/Refused	18

¹⁹ Q3. How would you characterize the current conflict in Syria?

It is mostly about ordinary Syrians seeking freedom from a repressive regime.....	37%
Israeli Jews.....	39

It is mostly about Islamist groups trying to take power.....	27
Israeli Jews.....	26
It is mostly a civil war among ethnic factions	28
Israeli Jews.....	28
Don't know/Refused	8

²⁰ Q21. Which of the following is closer to your view about the impact of the Arab Spring on Israel?

	11/12	11/11
It is mostly for the better	15%	
Israeli Jews.....	12	15%
It is mostly for the worse	51	
Israeli Jews.....	55	51
It makes no difference.....	21	
Israeli Jews.....	21	21
Not sure.....	5	
Israeli Jews.....	4	21
Don't know/Refused	8	14

²¹ Q23. Thinking about the next four years, what do you think is most likely to happen to the Israeli-Egyptian Peace Treaty?

It will remain in force in its present form	36%
Israeli Jews.....	37
It will remain in force, but will be modified.....	41
Israeli Jews.....	43
It will be terminated	17
Israeli Jews.....	16
Don't know/Refused	76

²² Q22. As you may know, Mohamed Morsi has been president of Egypt since June. Would you say his policies toward Israel have been:

Worse than you expected	23%
Israeli Jews.....	22
Better than you expected.....	17

Israeli Jews.....	14
About the same as you expected.....	48
Israeli Jews.....	53
Don't know/Refused.....	12

²³ Q28. In 2002, Arab countries offered the Arab Peace Initiative, a comprehensive peace deal with Israel based on Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in the 1967 war and full peace agreements between Israel and all Arab states. If this offer is renewed with support from Egypt's new government, how should the Israeli government react? Do you think it should:

Accept the offer as proposed.....	13%
Israeli Jews.....	7
Israeli Arabs.....	47
Accept the offer as the basis for negotiation.....	39
Israeli Jews.....	43
Israeli Arabs.....	19
Reject the offer.....	42
Israeli Jews.....	46
Israeli Arabs.....	20
Don't know/Refused.....	6

²⁴ Q14. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?

	11/12	11/11
I am prepared for a just and comprehensive peace with the Arabs based on the 1967 borders with agreed modifications and the establishment of a peaceful Palestinian state next to Israel.....	37%	
Israeli Jews.....	33	43%
Israeli Arabs.....	60	
Even if all the Arab states accept and recognize Israel I still oppose withdrawing from territories occupied in 1967 and the establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.....	30	
Israeli Jews.....	30	31
Israeli Arabs.....	32	
Neither.....	29	
Israeli Jews.....	33	24
Israeli Arabs.....	6	

Don't know/Refused	4	2
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²⁵ Q13. Which of the following statements are closest to your view about the prospects of lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians?

	11/12	11/11
It will happen in the next five years	7%	
Israeli Jews	4	6%
Israeli Arabs	24	
It is inevitable, but it will take more time	40	
Israeli Jews	40	42
Israeli Arabs	36	
I don't believe it will ever happen	51	
Israeli Jews	55	49
Israeli Arabs	31	
Don't know/Refused	2	3

²⁶ Q15. What do you believe is the likely outcome if the prospects of a two-state solution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict collapse?

	11/12	11/11
It will lead to a one-state solution in which Israelis and Palestinians are equal	13%	
Israeli Jews	5	4%
Israeli Arabs	59	
It will lead to a state of intense conflict for years to come	35	
Israeli Jews	38	34
Israeli Arabs	16	
The status quo will continue with little change	37	
Israeli Jews	42	47
Israeli Arabs	10	
Palestinians will eventually surrender to Israeli power give up and integrate into other societies	6	
Israeli Jews	7	9
Israeli Arabs	4	
Don't know/Refused	9	7

²⁷ [Ask Israeli Jews only]

Q20. Which of the following is your most important identity?

	11/12	11/11²⁷
Jewish.....	50%	35%
Israeli.....	37	29
Citizen of the world	9	15
My family's country of origin.....	3	16
Don't know/Refused	1	6

²⁸ [Ask Israeli Jews only]

Q12. Which of the following is closer to your views?

	11/12	11/11
The Jewishness of Israel is more important to me than its democracy	31%	27%
The democracy of Israel is more important to me than its Jewishness	33	26
Both are equally important to me.....	35	47
Don't know/Refused	2	1

²⁹ Q11. How would you describe the current status of Arabs in Israel?

	11/12	11/11
There is full equality between Arab and Jewish citizens	28%	
Israeli Jews.....	29	33%
Israeli Arabs	20	
There is legal equality, but institutional and societal discrimination	55	
Israeli Jews.....	56	52
Israeli Arabs	43	
It is an apartheid relationship.....	12	
Israeli Jews.....	8	7
Israeli Arabs	37	
Don't know/Refused	6	7